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The  Committee  on  External Economic  Relations hereby  submits  to  the 
European  Parliament  the  following  Motion  for  a  Resolution  together  with 
explanatory statement: 
MOTION  FOR  A  RESOLUTION 
or.  ·the relations between  the  European  Community and the East  European 
state-trading countries and  the  CMEA  (COMECON) 
The  European  Parliament, 
having  regard  to its resolution of 17  October  1980  on  the  fo.llow-up 
to the  Conference  on  Security and  Cooperation  in Europe held  in 
Madrid,  in which  Parliament outlined the  major  themes  and basic 
principles of  relations  in  the  economic  sphere  between the  Community 
and  its Member  States and  the  East  European  states, 
wishing to contribute to greater  cooperation with the East  European 
states  in  the  specific field of economic  and  trade relations, 
drawing attention  once  again to the  powers  conferred on  the  Community 
in  the  field of commercial  policy by Article  113  of the  EEC  Treaty, 
having regard  to the  Motion  for  a  Resolution tabled by  Mr  Christopher 
JACKSON  (Doc.  1-750/80), 
having regard  to  the report of  the  Comm~ttee on  External Economic 
Relations  (Doc.  1-424/81), 
~b~-P~~~~~~-§~~~~-~!-~~!~~i~~~-~~9-~s~~~~~~~~-e~~~~~~-~£~-~~~~~~i!r_~~§ 
the  individual  CMEA  countries 
1.  Wishes  to encourage  East-West  trade  for  both political and  economic 
reasons  and  therefore attaches great  importance  to the  strengthening 
of direct,  bilateral relations between  the  Community countries  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  signatory states of  the  CMEA  on  the  other; 
2.  Regrets  that,  for  whatever  reason,  most  CMEA  countries maintain  no 
diplomatic  relations with  the  EEC,  although no  less  than  113  third 
countries aready do  so; 
3.  Regrets  that  trade between  the  Community and the  individuai" 
CMEA  countries  is still not regulated by trade  agreements  despite 
the offer of negotiations  by  the  Community  in  1974; 
- 5  - PE  68. 466/fin. 4.  In  this connection welcomes  the conclusion  in  l98e  of  the  agreemen~ 
with Rumania  on  an  EEC-Rumania  Joint Committee  and  trade  in  indust-
rial products; 
5.  Calls  on  other  East  European countries  to conclude  similar  agreements 
with the  European  Community; 
6.  Warns  against the use  of the  ambiguous  nature  of many  of the 
bilateral cooperation agreements  between  Member  States of  the 
Community  and  individual  CMEA  countries  as  a  means  of circumventing 
the  common  commercial  policy; 
7.  Emphasises  that  in  its view  the  Community  is authorised to conclude 
cooperation agreements directly by virtue of its responsibility 
for  formulating  the  common  commercial  policy,  which  covers  in 
particular export  policy  (Article  113  of the  EEC  Treaty); 
8.  Calls also on  the  Member  States to take  account  of this  in  future 
and to  ta•ke  steps  to ensure  that the  Community  is  given  the 
instruments  necessary to  implement  such  a  policy; 
9.  Also  requests  that the  consultation procedure  for  cooperation  agree-
ments  decided  on  in  1974  shou~  be  amended  to  provide  effective 
Community  supervision of  these  agreements while respecting  the 
powers  of  the  Community  and  giving the  Community  a  comprehensive 
basis  for  a  cooperation  policy; 
10.  Stresses  that  one  prerequisite  for  an active trade policy by the 
Community  is a  common  credit policy and  above  all the  setting up 
and  progressive  development  of  a  Community reinsurance  system  for 
export credits,  which  are  normally channelled to market  conditions; 
and  points  out  in  this connection that its resolution of  17  October 
1980 called for  a  coordination  of credit policies; 
11.  calls on  the  Commission  to  push  ahead with the preliminary work  on 
which  it has  been  engaged  for  many  years but which has hitherto 
yielded  no  concrete results,  and  to  submit  proposals  for  guide-
lines  for  a  common  credit policy on  which  Parliament expects  the 
Council  to reach  a  swift decision; 
!~~-~~!~~!~9~-~~-~~2~~~~-~~~!~!~!~9~~~-~~~~!~9~~-~=!~~~~-!~~-~~~-~~~ 
the  CMEA 
12.  Notes  that  the  talks  instituted at the  initiative of the  CMEA 
countries  on  an  agreement with  the  Community have  failed to produce 
any  concrete results  so  far  and  that negotiations are still very 
laborious; 
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the  CMEA  to be  useful but  stresses that differences between  the 
conditions  in  the  various  C.t-iEA  countries rule out  the  inclusion 
of trade  provisions  in  such an  agreement,  and  notes  the  Community's 
initiative  that  a  reference  \:o  the  importance  of  trade between 
the  CMEA  and  the  Community  is  included  in  the  prearnlJle  to the 
framework  agreement; 
14.  Is  opposed  to an  agreement with  the  CMEA  being allowed  to  govern 
bilateral agreements  between  the  Conununity  and  the  individual  CMEA 
countries; 
l'i.  Supports  the  Commission  in  the negotiations  it has  conducted  so  far 
in which  it has  consistently upl1eld  the  aims  of  the Community; 
16.  Notes  that its resolution of  17  October  1980  called for  the  necessary 
steps to be  taken  to  solve  the  problems associated with certain 
obstacles  created by  the  imposition of  linked trade agreements  and 
dumping  by East  European  states on  Community markets; 
17.  compensation  arrangements 
- Points  to  the  incr·easing  number  of  compensation  transactions  in 
th<!  last  few  years  between  firms  in  the  Community  and  the  CMEA 
countries; 
No~es that these  practices  sometimes  have  drastic effects on 
existing or  potential EEC  industries,  threatening existing 
markets  and  new  employment  opportunities; 
- Notes  that difficulties arise  from  the non-convertibility of 
East  European currencies; 
- Calls  on  the  Commission  to  step up  its efforts to  find  ways  of 
controlling compensation  transactions  and  to  submit proposals  on 
means  by which  the  adverse  effec·ts  of  compensation  transactions 
on  the  Community's  economy  can be  reduced; 
- Requests  the  Coromission  to  dra'l-1  up  a  det.ail.ed report  for  communi-
cation  to  the Council  and  t.he  Eur_opean  Parliament,  on  the  operation 
of  cornpen~ation arrangements,  including an  opinion as  to whether 
the  adaptation of competition rules  is desirable; 
7  - PE  68.466/fin. 18.  Dumping 
- Is disturbed by  the  increasing cases  of  dumping by the  CMEA 
countries  whic~-,  ""·':linly affect a  number  of  economically sensitive 
sectors  in  the  Community  as well  as  end products,  and which are 
also  increasingly  impeuLng  the  transport and  services sectors; 
- Hopes  that the  Community will  further  improve  and,  in particular, 
will harmonise  the present lists of ·liberalised products  as  a 
replacement  for  the still existing bilateral  import  quotas  and 
that this policy will be  accompanied by negotiations with the 
state-trading countries  on  voluntary restraint agreements  for 
sensitive products; 
- Again  urges  the  Community authorities to act consistently and 
effectively in  the  transport  sector  to prevent  dumping  by the 
CMEA  countries; 
- Wishes  the  Commission  to publish  its findings  on  the operation of 
the  system  introduced  in  1978  for  monitoring  the activities of  the 
merchant  fleets  of third countries and calls on  the  Commission 
to  inform  Parliament of  its new  plans  in this respect  in  good  time; 
- Urges  that an  effective price clause  be  made  a  regular  feature 
of any  future  cooperation agreements; 
19.  The  East-West  German  trade 
-Recalls that·intra-German trade  is covered by  a  special protocol 
to the  Treaty of  Rome; 
- Requests  the  Commission  to publish,  on  a  regular  basis,  statistics 
under  a  special heading  in Euro-Stat concerning  intra-German 
trade; 
20.  Trade  in agricultural products 
- Asks  the  Commission  to  look  into  the  possibility of  expanding 
agricultural exports  from  the  Community  to  CMEA  countries without 
granting special preferences and without disadvantage  for  the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy; 
21.  The  trade  embargo 
- Asks  the  Community  authorities to give  an exposition of  the 
principles  and  effectiveness of the trade  embargo as  an  instrument 
of  Community  trade  policy,  with particular regard to  its possible 
application  to  the  CMEA  countries; 
- 8  - PE  68. 466/fin. - Instructs its appropriate  parliamentary committees  to draw·np 
an  own-initiative report on  the  question of the  COCOM  arrangements; 
22.  The  burden  of debts 
- Points to the  growing  indebtedness  of the East  European countries 
towards  the  industrialised countries and especially to the 
problem of  the debt  repayment ratios of  some  of these countries; 
- Believes that,  with a  view to creating a  Community credit policy, 
the  Community must  keep  a  close eye  on this  indebtedness and that 
concerted international efforts are necessary to  solve  the problem; 
!~~-~~~~~Y-~~~~~~-~~~-!b~-f~~-~9~~!~~~~ 
23.  - Notes  that by virtue of its large energy and raw material resources 
the  Soviet Union has been able to strengthen its trade  position 
within the  CMEA  and  vis-a-vis·the·Western countries; 
- Expects  that the  energy crisis is likely to have  adverse reper-
cussions  on  EEC  relations with the  CMEA  countries,  since  only by 
increasing exports  and  simultaneously reducing  imports will the 
latter be able  to achieve  the  foreign  exchange  surplus necessary 
to finance  their  energy requirements; 
- Calls  for  closer  cooperation  on  energy between the  Community  and 
the  individual CMEA  countries  in order  to reduce  unilateral 
depenq<i'lnce; 
Points  out that  in  its resolution  of  17 October  1980  it reaffirmed 
a  considerable  interest  in the  development  of cooperation  and  in 
the  study of suitable projects,  particularly in the  energy field·, 
and welcomes  the  preliminary work  ~o this end  in the  E~E; 
24.  Observes  the  slowdown  in  East-West  trade because of  the  economic 
and political situation and believes that the conclusion of the 
framework  agreement  between  the  Community  and the  CMEA  and  of  trade 
agreements  between  the Community  and  individual  CMEA  countries will 
contribute  to the reduction of obstacles  in East-West  trade  and to 
its further  development; 
0 
0  0 
25.  Instructs  its President to  forward  this resolution and  the attached 
report to  the  Governments  of the Member  States and  the Council and 
Commission  of the European  Communities. 
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EXPLANATORY  STATEMENT 
1.  Problems connected with  relations between  the  EEC  and  COMECON  are 
important not  only  because  rela~::~~ with  a  large  number  of  neighbouring 
countries are  involved,  but also because very little progress has been  made 
so far  in developing  these relations,  which  have  undergone considerable 
changes  in recent years. 
Various  features  of  trade relations with  the Eastern European countries 
differ radically  from  the  EEC's  traditional patterns  of  trade with  other  third 
countries.  They  have  a  different economic  system,  their  external  trade is 
determined by  state machinery,  and  they are grouped  together  in  an 
organization- COMECON  - w''1ch  does  not have  the  same  powers as  the  EEC: 
this means  that East-West  trade and  organized relations ~etween the  two 
parties demonstrate  some  distinctive characteristics,  with  specific  problems 
and  practices,  which  sometimes give rise. to polemic  statements questioning 
the  point  of  this trade.  Although it is often claimed  that East-West  trade 
offers more  concrete advantages  for  the Eastern European  states than  for  the 
EEC,  it should be  stated  from  the  outset that - as  long as certain well-
defined  principles are  observed  - the  EEC  has little or  no cause  to  oppose 
further  harmonious  development  of its trade relations with  the Eastern European 
countries.  This  problem  is dealt with  in greater detail in Chapter  V  of  this 
report. 
In  this connection your  rapporteur wishes  to draw  the attention of  the 
commission  and  the  Council  to the  importance which  the  European  Parliament 
attaches to being consulted whenever  the Community  is conducting  negotiations 
with  third countries.  As  the Community  is currently  engaged  in negotiations 
with  COMECON,  it is essential to  emphasize  Parliament's desire to have  a  say 
in  the  decision-making  process and  in  the Commission's  policy in  these 
negotiations. 
2.  It should be made clear from  the  start which countries belong  to COMECON. 
They  are  the  USSR,  the German  Democratic  Republic  (GDR),  Poland,  Vietnam, 
csechoslovakia,  Hungary,  Romania,  Bulgaria,  the Mongolian  People's Republic 
and  Cuba.  Albania  is a  passive member,- Yug_.c;>.slavia  takes part in certain 
areas  of  COMECON's  work  and Angola,  Ethiopia,  North  Korea  and Laos have 
observer  status.  When  we  talk in  this report  of relations with certain state-
trading countries,  we  are referring  only  to the Eastern bloc  members  of 
COMECON  and  not,  for  instance,  to certain Asian  COMECON  countries.  Trade 
with Mongolia,  Vietnam  and  North  Korea  is not  substantial and  is therefore 
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3.  There are  many  complex facets  to East-West  economic  relations.  As 
far  as relations between  the European  Community  and  the above-mentioned 
Eastern bloc countries are concerned,  your  rapporteur will concentrate 
primarily  on  three aspects:  first,  agreements with  individual state-
trading countries;  second,  the  possible conclusion  of  an agreement with 
COMECON  as  a  whole  and,  third,  the  problem  of certain practices of  East 
European  firms  and  states and  their repercussions  on  trade relations. 
Each  of  these aspects will be dealt with  in  turn,  with  a  description 
of  the  present  situation and  a  look at possible future  developments. 
II.  The  state of relations and  agreements  between  the  EEC  and  the Eastern 
European  state-trading countries 
4.  Since  1969,  the  end  of the transitional period,  the  EEC  alone has. 
been  empowered  to pursue  an·· autonomous  trade  policy.  The  period \!Jas  extended 
in the  case  of its relations with state-trading countries,  but since  1975 
it has  been  forbidden  for  Community Member  States to conclude  individual 
2 
trade  agreements  with  these  countries  • 
When  the  earlier,  individual  agreements  expired  in 1974,  the  Community 
made  it clear  to the  COMECON  countries that it was  prepared  to negotiate 
trade  agreements  to replace  the  old  ones. While  waiting for the CoMEcON 
parties to take  up  this  offer of  negotiations,  and  in order  to fill the 
vacuum  thus  created,  the  Community  took  the  following  rne~sures: 
3 
an autonomous  import  system was  created  ,  a  general  outline  agreement 
(together with  a  proposal  on textiles)  was  drawn  up and  a  joint consultation 
procedure  for  the  cooperation  agree~nts between  individual  EEC  Member 
States  and  member  states of  COMECON  was  set  u~ 
5.  Cooperation agreements,  which  provide  for  technical,  scienti.fic, 
economic  or  industrial cooperation,-are still a  thorny problem.  In  some 
cases,  these  agreements  are  in the  form  of declarations  of  intent .in  .. 
1  China  (not  a  member  of COMECON),  on  the  other  hand,  has been  the first 
state-trading country after Yugoslavia  but before Romania  to conclude  a 
trade agreement with  the  Community  (on  the ?attern  of  EEC  agreements)  on 
which  the committee  on  External  Economic  Relations has already  published 
a  report 
2  From  1  January  1973  all Member  States of  the  Community were  forbicden 
to negotiate  or  sign  a  bilateral trade  agreement with an Eastern bloc 
country;  most  bilateral trade  agree~nts expired  on  31  December  1974. 
3 
This  autonomous  import  scheme  is simply  a  Community list of  import 
quotas.  By  30  November  each year  the Council  of  the  European  Communities 
must  decide  on  the  changes  to be  made  to the  scheme  for  the  following 
year. 
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promote  cooperation. 
These  texts usually contain a  description  of  the administrative methods 
to be  used  to  implement  the cooperation  envisaged.  Proposals  for  specific 
cooperation  projects  a"-·- set  out  in annexes  to the  agreement  or contained  in 
separate  protocols.  Larger  countd">s,  whose  objectives in cooperating with 
Eastern  Europe  are not  purely  economic,  sometimes  inc~z:porate specific 
cooperation  projects in  their cooperation agreements to>help boost  the  prestige 
of certain  sectors  of  their national economy. 
In addition,  these agreements create a  framework within which  undertakings 
and  industrialists and  businessmen are  able  to increase direct contacts 
and  seek various  practical  forms  of  cooperation.  One  major  prOb·lem  is 
that,  owing  to the  oftenambiguous nature  of  these  agreements  - the 
distinction between  a  tra~G agreement  and  a  cooperation agreement.is 
difficult to draw  - the  Member  States  of  the  European  Community  circum: 
vent  community  powers  and  even  fail to comply with the  consultation 
1 
procedure 
6.  It is the  task  of  the  European  Parliament to urqe  the commission  to pursue 
a  consistent  poli~ and  - as is the case with  other  third countries  -
itself institute Community  cooperation agreements  or  change  the  ccmsul.,-
taion procedure  set up  by  the  decision of  22  July 1974  so·)as  to make  it 
a  suitable  means  of  obtaining all the  necesnary  information fr the 
implementation  of  a  truly common  policy in the  field  of  cooperation. 
Cooperation agree.ments  do constitute an  important  framework within 
which  individual  contacts  between undertakings  can  be  facilitated,. 
although their  importance  should  not  be  over-estimated,  since  they  form 
,,  .  2  the  basis  of  only  10%  of  our  relations with Eastern b1oc  countr~es  • 
7.  An  encouraging  feature  is the  number  of sectoral agreements 
concluded  since  1975  between  the European  Community  and  individual 
COMECON  countries,  particularly on  steel and  textiles. 
1 
2 
On  this point  see  Written Questions  Nos~-939/79 by  Mr  Martinet  and 
486/80  by the  rapporteur.  The  Commission  points  out  in its answers  that 
the  main  difference  between  a  trade  and  a  cooperation agreement  is that,. 
while  the  aim  of  the  latter is generally to develop  economic  relations 
between  the  parties concerned,  it contains  no  specific provisions  on 
trade.  The  Commission  acknowledges,  however,  _that  this distinctiam is 
a  subtle  one  and  fully shares  the  rapporteur's  concern  on  this point. 
Based  on  statistics  by  the  United Nations  Economic  Commission  for  Europe. 
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agreements  for  steel products with czechoslovakia  and  Hungary  (which 
allowed  market  penetration  by  these  countries  of up to  90%  of  Czech 
or  Hungarian  steel sales:  under  these  agreements  these  countries 
undertook  not  to sell their steel below  a  given  EEC  price).  Steel agreements• 
along  the  same  lines also exist with  Bulgaria,  Romania  and  Poland.  The 
first textile agreement  to come  into force  was with Romania  in November  1976 
(renewed  in  1977),  then with  Hungary,  Poland and  Bulgaria.  However,  these 
c oun tries made  reservations cone erning  the  EEC  terri  tory  to which  the 
.  b  1  agreement  was  appllca  le. 
Talks  were·also held  between  the  European  Community  and East 
Germany,  Poland  and  the  USSR  on  fisheries. 
8.  An  agreement  of  exceptional  importance is the  first,  and  so far 
only,  trade agreement,  namely  between  the  EEC  and  Romania  on  trade  in 
industrial products,  which  was  initialled_ this year.  Under this  agr.eement 
there will  be  no tariff concessions  for  imports  of Romanian  products 
inEo  the  Community,  but  import  restrictions are  to be  abolished  or  sus~ 
pended  according  to the  product  concerned  - this applies particularly to a 
uumber  of  Romanian  products  such  as chemicals,  fertilizers,  glass· and 
ceramics.  For  its part  Romania  has  undertaken  to increase and  diversify its 
'  purchases  of  Community  products.  It is hoped  that other  Eastern bloc 
countries will follow  the  example  of  the  only  COMECON  member  to have accepted 
the Community's  invitation to conclude  a  bilateral trade agreement. 
This  is not  inconceivable,  in view  of  the significant change  that 
has  come  about  in  the attitude  of  the  Spcialist countries  towards  the 
Community.  Whereas  in  the  1960s  they tended  to be  antagonistic  t~ards 
the  EEC,  in the  1970s  their attitude  changed,  perhaps  as  a  result of 
the  famous  speech  by  Leonid  Brezhnev  in  1972  in which  he  stated  that he 
recognized  'the realities  in Western  Europe•.  This  speech left the  111:ay 
free  for  a  number  of  COMECON  countries  and,  soon  afterwards,  negotiations 
were  started,  leading to  the  results  mentioned  above.  The  fact that the 
first  trade  agreement has  been  concluded  at a  time  when  negotiations 
with  COMECON  are  at  a  standstill is  an  indication that we  may expect 
further approaches  by  individual countries. 
1 
Any  agreement concluded by  the  Community .\'lith. third.co.untries refers to 
the  territories to wh.ic.h  the. Treaty.  of  Rome.  applies. (Artic.le  227  of  the 
EEC  Treaty),  which  inc lLlde  West. Be.r.lin,  on  the basis  of. a  declaration by 
th~ Government  ~£  th~ Federal Republic  of  Germany  in annex to the  Treaty. 
Th~s d~  facto.sltuat~on ls considered  unacceptable by  the Socialist 
countr~es,  Whlch  refuse  to recognize  Berlin as  part  of  the  Federal 
Repub llc  of  Germany. 
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con1munity  must also back  this  u~ with an effective autonomous credit policy. 
The  wide  range  of  goods  offered  by Western  industrialized  coU:nt"x-ies, · 
and  the  combination  of  unsatisfied  demand  and  the  continuing  shortage 
of  foreign  exchange  in  ~:,"'  COMECON  countries,  create  conditions  of  cG>m.,. 
petition in which  the granting  of  credits plays  a  dominant  role. 
It is  a  regrettable  fact  that a  veritable  'credit race'  is taking 
place,  not  only between  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Community but. 
also between  the  latter and  other Western  indus~rialized nations.  Selec7 
tive State  intervention to subsidize  national  export  industries has  led 
····-·--- --- -----
to considerable differences  in the  terms··-of  financing,  and  this  seriously 
distorts  competition  on  export  markets, 
Although  the  Court  of Justice  of  the  European communities has 
expressly stated that  •export credits'  fall within  the  autonomous  powers 
of  the  European  Community,  they still tend  to be  run  on  a  national.basis. 
Community harmonization  in the  field  of  export credits,  particula~Ly 
vis-a-vis  80MECON  countries,  is making  slow  progress  and  it has  so  far 
proved  impossible  to coordinate  the  various  national  procedures  and 
policies  on  the  granting  of credit. 
A  positive  feature,  however,  is that  the  Commission  and  the  Member 
States have  actively collaborated  to reach the  'OECD  Consensus'  on  minimum 
interest r·ates  and  the  maximum  duration  of  export credits. 
This  'consensus'  was  first  signed in June  l976··and renewed  in February 
1978  for  an  indefinite period  subject to annual  review. 
All  the member  countries  of  OECD  are  ~arty to it exce~t Iceland and 
Turkey. 
In  the case  of  the  EEC  the consensus was  ratified by  a  Council decision 
of  14  March  1977. 
In  May  1980  the  interest rates were  increased  slightly  (+  0.75%  for  the 
East  European countries).  However,  in  order  to  ~ursue a  truly common  comrner-
c ia  1  ~olicy,  the Community  must first  develo~ a  c ammon  credit·· policy. 
After all,  the granting  of credit i.s  a  .~eans of  influencing  trade  flows 
and  therefore  the  volume  of credit and  the conditions  under  which it is 
granted must  be  determined at Community  level. 
'rhis  problem  is however  too complex  to be dealt with  in this  study. 
- 14  - PE  68.466 /fin. III.  The  state  of  institutional relations between  the EEc·and  COMECON 
10.  It should  be  stressed  that  the  initiative  to negotiate an agreement came 
from  COMECON  itself.  At  the  same  time,  it should not be  forgotten  that,  as 
institutions,  the  EEC  and  COMECON  are very different in character.  The  degree 
of  integration  and  the  powers  of  COMECON,  for  instance,  cannot be compared 
with  those  of  the  Community;  the  EEC  has exclusive  powers  to pursue  a 
common  commercial  policy,  whereas  COMECON  has  no  such  powers.  AdmittedLy, 
COMECON  as  an  institution  may  conclude  agreements  but it  halit  no  legal 
powers  whatsoever  to impose  the  implementation  of  such an agreement  on 
its members.  Naturally,  this situation creates  serious  problems.  More~ 
over,  COMECON  has still not  officially recognized  the  &~  - despite  the 
current negotiations - though  it did finally  agree  to negotiate with  the 
commission  of  the  European communities  (not with  the council). 
11.  For  these  reasons  the  Commission  proposed  that the  projected  agree~ 
ment  should  contain  a  detailed  preamble  in wh:ich  both parties express 
their desire  to develop  trade  relations  and  agree  that each  indiv.idual 
COMECON  country will  conclude  a  bilateral agreement  with the  Community 
for  the  purpose  of  implementing  the  agreement.  This  is  one  of the  crucial 
points which  COMECON  is still refusing  to acceJ?t. 
12.  What  st-aqe  has  been  reached  in tbe;:;e  negotiations2~  From the  very 
outset  the  Commission  and  COMECON  have differed as  to the  form  an 
agreement  should  take  and  each  side  has  rejected  more  or less explieitLy 
the  proposals  put  forward  by the  other.  The  Community did  make  an  attempt 
to reach  a  compromise  on  a  number  of points,  but  the  overwhelming 
impression  is that  COMECON  is simply looking for  new  ways  to formulate  o1d 
proposals.  In its most  recent  proposals it bas  revived its previeus 
demands  with  regard to the  •most-favoured  nation clause',  •credit 
facilities•  and  'non-discrimination',  even  in the  agricultural  sector~ 
Although  the  Community  must  be  deemed  in  a  position to compromise  on 
certain poin·ts,  COMECON  is clearly quite  unable  to do  so. 
Consequently,  no  agreement  has  yet. been  reached  and  it is stilL 
impossible  to predict  when  this will happen.  The  view  recently  expressed by 
the Commission Vice-President "Mr  HAFERKAMP .. 'that consultations at political 
level  should be  suspended ·unt'il  COMEC'ON""  adopts  a  more  reasonable attitude 
suggests that  there is a  pers-istent state  of  incomprehension  on  the  COMECON 
side. 
A detailed account  of  negotiations  between  the  EEC  and  COMECON  from 
the  beginning  to the  present day,  is given  in Annex  I. 
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13.  For western  European  industries,  trading with  Eastern  Europe  is fraught 
with  major  problems. 
In virtually all East  European countries  the  market  situation is. 
totally different  from  that  in  our  Community,  with its free  market 
economy.  Market  transparency is restricted to a  minimum  and  the  state 
undertakings  or  special  co~mercial agencies  through which negotiations 
are  conducted  are  bound  by  the strict rules  of the  planned  economy. •. At 
the  same  time  the  East European countries  do  not  always wish to trade 
in their  most  competitive  products  but  frequently in products  for  ~hich 
they have  an  export capacity but  for which  there  is little demand  in.the 
West  (for  instance,  sensitive  products,  products  in  surplus  in Europe, 
poor quality products  and  so  on). 
In  addition,  most  of  these countries are having  to contend with  a  serious 
shortage  of hard currency,  and  in view  of  the deficit in  their  balance  of 
trade with  the west  they are  very  anxious  to step  up  their  exports while at 
the  same  time  adopting  a  fairly  protectionist attitude towards certain of  our 
products. 
14.  Hence,  the  great difficulty for  these  state-trading countries is to 
increase  their exports to the  EEC  to the  same  extent as  their  imports 
from western  Europe. 
However,  since  East European  state undertakings are  often  not  in  a 
position to compete with West  European  firms as regards  selling their  products 
on  EEC  Member  States'  markets,  they  tend  to resort to practices which give 
them  technical and  financial  advantages at the  expense  of  the Community's 
industries,  markets and  employment;  a  typical example  is the  use  of 
•compensation agreements'  (barter deals,  reciprocal  purchasing arrangements, 
buy-back deals).  The  deeper  the recession  in  the West  the greater  the demand 
for  countertransactions in  the centrally planned  economies,  because  of  the  loss 
of  markets  in  the West,  the  lack  of  foreign  exchange  and  the  inability to 
switch  the manufacturing  industry's production at short notice  to exportable 
itenrs. 
It would  therefore be  useful  to give  a  brief  summary  at this point  of  the 
various compensation arrangements. 
a.  Compensation  arrangements 
15.  Barter  transactions,  i.e.  transactions  in which  goods are  exchanged  for 
goods,  have  always  formed  the basis  for  foreign  trade relations within 
COMECON.  This  is  a  result of  the planned  economy  system used  in  the 
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accept goods,  and  of  the  non-convertibility of East European  currencies. 
16.  In  recent years  such  transactions have  played  an  increasingly  important 
role  in  COMECON's  foreign  trade with  the West.  The  main  reasons for  this 
development are  to be  found  in  the  disequilibrium  of  the  Eastern bloc countries' 
trade balances,  which  need  to be  stabilized by  drastically reducing  imports 
and considerably  increasing  exports. 
The  following  reasons are advanced  to account  for  this increase  in 
compensation  transactions: 
(l)  owing  to its high  external debt  and chronic shortage  of  foreign 
exchange,  Eastern Europe  is obliged to pay for  its imports  in kind; 
(2)  These  transactions  make  up  for  Eastern Europe's  lack of  a  commercial 
policy and  strategy. 
The  poor  sales  organizations of East European  countries  and  the  low 
quality of  goods  on  offer  means  they cannot  be  sold through the 
normal  channels  on  Western markets; 
(3)  The  financing  of  imports  not  provided for  in  the plan.  Since  no 
foreign  exchange  has  been budgeted for  these  imports,  the  likelihood 
of  selling  them is very small.  The  same  applies to goods  to which 
the  state authorities  have  attached a  low priority  (consumer  goods, 
certain industrial goods). 
-(4)  The  desire  to establish firm  links wit:h Western  undertakings with  a 
view to  the regular  importation  of  advanced  technologies.  If,  for 
instance,  a  Western  exporter  knows  that  he will have  to buy  back  a 
proportion  of  the  goods  manufactured  in  the  factory  he  is building 
in  the Eastern bloc,  then  he  has  every interest in  allowing  his 
East European partners  to enjoy the benefits  of  the  latest techno-
logical developments  and  he will be  more  attentive  to  the quality of 
lhe  goods  produced. 
17.  'Compensation  arrangements'  is a  general  term covering  a  variety  of 
different transactions ·ranging  from  the  simple  exclange  of  goods  for  goods 
to fully-fledged  industrial cooperation. 
A  distinction is normally  made  between  .. the  following  types  of  transaction: 
- ~~£~~£-~£~~~ is compensation  based purely on  an  exchange  of goods 
without  money  being  involved. 
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a'1rees  t.o  accept part or  full payment  in  merchandise.  In  compensation 
~r~nR~rti~nR the  commitments  to  buy  and  to sell are regulated  in  a 
<lir•q.l<>  ~nntr;,<"t,  whi~h m'lkes  the  implementation  of  such  transactions 
~ery  romplir'~~"'~  Rn~ time-consuming. 
Full campensatJon  is  similar  to barter  trAding,  although  the West 
Et1rnpee~n  <>nd  East  European  deliveries  are  paid for  in  cash  - independ-
ently of  each  other  - and  the Western  exporter  has  the possibility of 
transferring his  obligation  to buy  to  a  third party. 
Tn  t-.he  r"<~.se  of  p_a]::tial  compensation  the Western  exporter  receives  a 
percentaqe  of  his  payment  in cash  and  the rest in East European  goods. 
The  g_isadvan~ of  partial compensation  is that  the Western  exporter 
receives  prompt  payment  for  only  a  percentage  of his  supplies.  He 
does  not  receive  the remainder  until a  purchas•rfor  the East European 
goods  has  been  found  and  has  made  his payment.  At  the  moment  about 
lO  to  15%  of all countertrade  takes  the  form  of  compensation  transactions. 
- I~<::iE~Q.~~!-E~~'=~~~~~q-~~~?_~g~l!l.~ll!:~ constitute  the  most  common  form  of 
countertrade.  Under  this  arrangement  the Western  ex_porter  undertakes 
to  buy  East European  goods  egual  to  thEl__value  .. o:f;  a  given_percentage of 
his  su_pp lies.  The  main  difference between  this  system and  compensation 
is  that  two  separate  contracts  are  concluded:  one  for  the Western 
exporter's  sale  and  one  for  his  commitment  to buy,  each containing  a 
reference  to  the  other  contract.  Unlike  compensation transactions, 
the  exporter  receives  payment  immediately after delivery is  made  and 
has  time  to  look  around  for  suitable goods  and  to fulfil his  commitment 
to  buy.  The  Western  buyer  must  then ·make ·payment -for  the reciprocal 
purchases direct  to  the  East  European  vendor. 
-·  In  the  latter  two  cases it is customary that  the Western  exporter  is 
allowed  to  choose  from  a  list of  goods.  The  longer  the  list,  the 
grea~er the  likelihood  of  finding  a  product  that can be  sold relatively 
easily  on  Western  markets.  .Even  though  the  list may  be  long,  there  is 
no~.  howAver,  complete  freedom  to  choose  which  goods  to  take  in  compensa-
tion,  her:ause  the  compensation  goods  on  the  list are  subdivided  into 
product  categories  and  a  proportion of  the  goods  must  be  taken  from 
each one. 
- ~~Q~~~!-E~Ye~~~-?.~~~gq~~~g~~· also  known  as  buy-back  deal~ or  industrial 
<:!ompensation:  this type  of  transaction is gaining  ground  more  rapidly 
than  any  other  system.  Under  this procedure Western  factories  or 
industrial plant are  purchased  and  paid for  with  products  manufactured 
hy  th<>  new  plant  ('lgreements  of  this kind  are  common,  for  instance,  in 
th~ chemicals  sector). 
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in goods manufactured with the  plant  supplied and  with Western  techno-
logy  and  know-how ...  Payments  made  in this way  may  amount  to -as  mu~h--as 
100%  of the  value of  the goods  supplied from Western  Europe.  until 
recently product payback  arrangements  usually covered between  20  and  3~/o 
of  the overall payment,  but this  has  risen in  the  last few years: 
there  have  even  been  cases where  the Western  exporter has  had to sign 
long-term contracts  to take goods  for  up  to  200%  of  the  value of  the 
goods  he  originally supplied. 
- certain forms  of  ~~~~~~~~1-~22E~~~~~Q~ are  sometimes  included under  the 
general heading  of  compensation transactions:  these may  range  from the 
transfer of  licences  to collaboration in  joint undertakings. 
lastly,  there is the  ·~~~!:~~·  or  !~~~~2~~!-~~~~~~~!:~~~- There are 
usually  t'hree  or  more countries  invol-ved  in  each  switch· transaction,·  one· 
generally be·ing  an  industr·ial"ized ·country,  one  an  East·· European country 
and  one  a  developing country.  Between  two  of  them,  generally  the  East 
European country and  the developing country,  there will be  a  clearing 
agreement  whereby  the  East European country can  use its debt claim  on  the 
developing country as payment  for  a~··purbhase in the  industrialized country. 
In other words  the  socialist country's balance-of-payment  surplus with a 
developing country is used as a  means  of  payment  to finance  that  same 
country's  structural balance-of-payment deficit with an  industrialized 
country. 
lB.  Generally speaking,  where  compensation transactions  involve 
9~~1~~~~!:~EY products,  they do  little harm  to  our  economy:  on  the  other 
hand,  when  they involve products which  ~2~E~E~ with Community  products, 
these  compensation deals  can  do  serious  damage  to established or  envisaged 
Community  industries.  They threaten existing markets  or prevent  the 
creation of  new  jobs.  The  European  Community-must  take  steps  to avoid  this 
happening,  since  these  practices ar·e· very heav-ily  and  one-sidedly  to  the 
advantage  of  East European  industries,  in  the  following  ways: 
{'1)  their  industry is being built up  on  extensive Western  credit 
(at subsidized interest rates); 
('2)  the transfer of  technology enables  them  to  establish their  own 
{competitive)  industries; 
(~)  these practices allow  them access  to markets which,  without buy-
hack deals,  would  be  closed to them. 
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it should be  pointed out that oountertrade. does  seem to fulfil  a  worth-
while  function  in East-West  trade,  particularly as  a  source of  foreign 
exchange  (for  the East)  and  as  a  means  of  creating markets  (for  thcl  West). 
Countertrade can be  advantageous  to both  sides:  examples  of  this are  the 
transactions between  the Soviet union  and certain EEC  countries  whereby 
the  former  receives  natural-gas pipelines  and  supplies,  in return,  raw 
materials which  the Community  lacks. 
Eastern bloc  markets  present a  challenge and  potential advantages  to  our 
exporters precisely because of  the  saturation of  our  and other  markets. 
The  only  reasonable attitude,  therefore,  is to accept compensation trans-
actions  only under  the most  favourable  conditions possible and  to oppose 
them whenever  they are  detrimental to the interests of  our  consumers, 
producers  or  industries. 
20.  As  there is no common  trade  policy  in this  sector either,  the Commission 
must  be  asked what it is  in fact  doing  to enforce  the  powers  it enjoys 
vis-a-vis  the  Member  States of  the  Community  and to ensure  that practices 
described above  do  not  adversely affect the Community. 
This means  in  practice that  the Commission  must be  urged  to draw  up  a 
Code  of  practice for  compensation  arrangements with specific and strict 
norms,  which will give it the  power  - as  in  the  case of  the European 
provisions  on  competition  - to  impose  sanctions  on practices that disturb 
the market.  At  the  same  time it must  intensify its surveillance by 
setting up  a  special service to investigate all compensation  agreements, 
whose  notification will be  compulsory. 
b.  Dumping ·by 'the"COMECON countries  in  the  goods  and  transport  sectors of 
the  Community 
21.  Dumping  by  Eastern bloc countries is mainly concentrated  in  two  sectors: 
(l)  Dumping  in  the textile,  steel and  finished  products  sectors; 
(2)  Dumping  in  the maritime  transport and  other  sectors  (maritime  dumping). 
22.  Serious disturbances are caused  on  the  European  market  by  various 
COMECON  countries disposing  of  their  textiles and  steel products below cost. 
For  these  sensitive products  the European  Community· should conclude 
voluntary restraint agreements,  with the  COMECON  countries so that 
products  from  these  countries  to the  Community  are exported at prices 
which  do  not  cause  market  disturbances. 
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of  finished products  of all kinds.  The  appended list speaks  for itself 
and  underlines  the  seriousness  of the problem. 
Dumping  of finished  products by  the Eastern bloc is quit·e common,  but 
in  many  cases  complaints  come,to  nothing  either because  dumping  is 
difficult to prove or because the  Eastern bloc countries  themselves 
voluntarily cut back  their sales of  these products  or put  up prices. 
Cases  of  dumping  are generally characterized by  the  followfng  features: 
1.  Normally  the products  involved  are  simple to manufacture,  using 
technologies  that are  already well  established in the west. 
2.  The  products  are often  manufactured  in  the West  in relatively 
uncompetitive  conditions,  by western  undertakings which  are less 
modern  than  the more  recent East European  production centres. 
3.  Dumping  complaints  are normally made  when  the products  from  the 
Eastern bloc have  already acquired  a  large market  share  !to the 
detriment  of  domestic  producers  in the west. 
Generally  speaking,  domestic  producers do not react until  th~y feel 
the  adverse  effects of  dumping;  complaints  are seldom made before 
this stage,  even when  the prices  of Eastern bloc products  are very  low 
(for example,  LADA  cars  from  the  USSR). 
1 
Once  the  anti-d~ping complaint has been made,  it is difficult to 
come  up with  concrete evidence.  Internal wholesale prices  are  a 
state secret  and  are  not published  in  any  of the  Eastern bloc countries. 
At  the  same  time,  the· complicated pricing  system  (differences between 
internal  and  external prices)  make  the  investigation procedure more 
difficult.  Similarly,  compensation  arrangements  are in  fact  a  form 
of  concealed  dumping,  where  products  are sold at reduced prices by 
representatives  or  firms  specialized in  countertransactions. 
In many  cases,  in order  to prove  that  products are being  sold below 
their  normal  value,  raw material  prices and cost prices have  to be 
estimated. 1 
~~~~p~~:  In  the action br.ought by  the Federation  of British Printers 
against  suppliers  .. of  Chri.stmas cards .impor.ted. from  the. USSR  .. ( 1.978)  it 
was  found  that  the  Russian  price represented  less than half  of  the wages 
and material costs,  quite apart from  manufacturing costs and  overheads. 
- 21  - P~ 6B. 466 /fin. In  most cases  of  dumping,  Community  action is made  more  difficult by 
the  continued eKistence  of  differences  in national  regulations.  The 
commission  must therefore be  urged  once  again  to continue·to harmenize 
the existing liberalization lists  (replacing  the present  system  ~f 
bilateral import quotas)  and  to adapt  them to current  require~ents. 
23.  Dumping  on  the  Community's  transport markets. 
The  procedure  adopted  by  the  COMECON  countries in  the  fields  of 
sea  transport,  inland waterway  transport  and  road transport in the 
1  Community  is roughly  as  follows 
- Enterprises  from  the  COMECON  countries collaborate  w~th Western  shipping 
and  transport undertakings  or establish their  own  branch offices  in 
the  Community.  {Western  undertakings  are not  allowed to  do  this in 
COMECON  countries.) 
- Western  importers  and  exporters  are  increasingly required to effect 
corresponding  transactions  through East  European  transport under-
takings. 
Freight rates in  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Community  are 
undercut by  up  to  50%,  with  the result that such dumping  practices 
are  threatening  the  existence of increasing numbers  of western 
undertakings. 
'Maritime'  dumping  in  particular is steadily increasing  in  these 
markets,  with  ships  from  COMECON  countries  accounting  for  35%  of 
sea traffic in the North Atlantic. 
Two  factors  explain this  increase  in  transport by  East European  -
mainly Soviet - fleets  : 
(l)  The  USSR  stipulates  in trade contracts  concluded with 
Western  partners that the  goods  must be  transported in its 
own  ships. 
{2)  The  Russian merchant  fleet  is playing  an  increasingly 
important  role  in transport  in the  North Atlantic,  along 
the West  African coast  and  in  the  Indian Ocean. 
Its freight rates are considerably  lower  (from  15-20  to  40%)  than  the 
normal average Western  rates.  These  diff~rences are accountefr for by·the  fac~ 
that  the cost of depreciation and  insurance for  ships  is borne by  the  state 
and  because  their  labour costs are  kept fairly  low. 
1  Schmid Report- Doc.  89/78- (PE  51.342/fin.)  p.  24 
- 22  - PE  68.46fy'fin. 24.  At  the  same  time,  the  Community appears  to be  in a  paradoxical 
situation  in which  the  very countries that are afraid of  these  dumping  practices 
do  not hesitate  to offer  extremely  favourable conditions in contrac':s for  the 
supply  of vessels  to the  Eastern bloc. 1 
On  19  September  1978  the Council adopted  a  decision concerning  the 
activities of certain third countries in  the field  of  ca~gn shipping 
(78/744/EEC,  OJ  No.  L  258  of  21.9. 1978).  This Council Decision relates to an 
information  system  on certain cargo liner routes.  The  Committee  on  External 
·Economic  Relations'  opinion  on  this  problem is contained  in  the report drawn 
up  by  Mr  K.  JUNG
2
•  The  system  instituted provides  for  sanctions in  the  form 
of  extra harbour  dues  or  quotas if dumping  is proved. 
The  rapporteur has no  information  about  the  development  and results of 
the  new  system.  The  pronounced  silence  of  the Commission as regards practical 
results can  only  mean  that  the  system has  proved  a  failure and  is working 
either  unsa~isfactorily or  not at all.  It does  seem  that  the Commission  is to 
submit  proposals  to the Council  in connection with  this  problem before  the  end 
of  1980.  The  rapporteur  is sorry,  however,  that the Commission  feels  unable 
to  provide  the  European  Parliament with more  information. 
c.  The  'East-West German  Gap' 
25.  Another  problem which  urgently  needs  to be  clarified by the 
Commission  is that  of  'German  internal trade',  its precise  volume  and 
its impact  on  intra-Community trade.  It is not at all clear at this.stage. 
whether  the  'East-West  German  gap•  consitutes  a  serious  loophole  through. 
which  products  from Eastern Europe  penetrate  our  market without  ~aying 
customs  duties· 
26.  The  Treaty  of Rome  makes  provision  for  a  special  system for  trade 
between East  and west  Germany,  whereby  East  Germany  i·s  not subject,  in 
respect of its trade with west  Germany,  to  Community  customs  regulations 
applicable to goods  from  third countries. 3 
1  ~~~~e~~:  In  1979 France  signed  a  contract with  Poland  for  the  supply  of  four 
ships,  which will be  sold to Poland at half their cost price with  a 
state subsidy  of FF  450 million.  (See  Le!'·Monde,  27  January  1979). 
2  Report  on  the  EEC's  relations with  the  COMECON  countries in the field  of 
maritime  shipping.  Doc.  51/79  - 11 April  1979. 
3 
See  'Protocol  on  German  internal  trade  and ·:connected problems'· 
Article  1  'Since  trade between  the German  territories  subject to tht 
--------- Basic  Law  for  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany  ana  the  German 
territories in which  the  Basic  Law  does  not  apply is part of 
German  internal trade,  the  application  of this Treaty  in 
Germany  requires  no  change  in the treatment  currently accorded 
this trade.' 
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German  states,  there is only  one  German  nation,  does  not  apply  Community 
rules  on  trade with third countries  to East  Germany,  which  is  sometimes 
known  as  the  'tenth member  of the  EEC'.  It is estimated that thio  status 
is worth $4,000 million per  year  to  the  GDR. 
What  are  the  specific  advantages  of  this  special  status? 
- Community  customs  tariffs are  not applied to the GDR. 
- East  German  products  escape the quota  system in  force between  COMECON 
countries  and  the  EEC. 
-East German  agricultural  products  (20%  of  the  GDR's  total exports)  are 
sold  in the Federal Republic  at domestic market prices  (or  at Community 
intervention prices)  and  are  therefore not  subject to the levies which 
finance.the  EAGGF. 
- Since trade  (imports  and exports)  between  the  two  states is not  always 
in balance,  West  Germany  effectively grants  the  GDR  an  interest-free 
'ewing'  credit,  which  for  the  period 1979-81 has been estimated at 
DM  850  million, 
the  Bundesbank  and  the  East  German  Central  Bank  conduct  their clearing 
operations  in  a  currency whose  exchange  rate is equal  to that of the 
west  G·erman  mark. 
- The  possibility of East  German  goods being re-exported by west  Germany. 
Expert  opinion is  divided  on  this question.  According  to  some,  it is 
impossible to check  on  re-export;  all  'made  in  Germany'  products  are 
assumed  to have  been  manufactured  in west  Germany  and are therefore 
considered  as  a  Community  product. 
According  to others,  this kind of  fraud  tends  to be the rare exception 
and  involves  only  agricultural products. 
A  second potential  drawback  is the possibility for  third countries 
(particularly other Eastern bloc countries),  to use  the  German  internal 
trade  system to put their goods  onto the  Community  market via East 
Germany,  possibly after  minor  proceas~~g. 
In  other words,  there is  a  constant risk that  countries  may  circumvent 
community  provisions  and  abuse  the  German  internal  trade system in  order 
to dispose  of their goods  on  the  Community market without paying  duties 
or  levies. 
- 24- PE  68.466/fin. 28.  In  order  to  estimate accurately how  much  damage  the  Community  is suffering 
it is important  to know  the  volume  of German  internal  trade.  Here  too, 
figures  differ  somewhat.  Most  sources~  however,  put  th-e  GDR' s·  trade ·with ·the 
west at  25%  of  its total  trade  (42%  in  1970;  30%  in  1976;  26.5%  in 1977). 
More  than  one-third  of  this  25%  is with  the Federal Republic  of  Germany. 
According  to the  DIW  (German  Institute for  Economic  Research)  German 
internal trade amounts  to  DM  10,000 million.  (By  way  of comparison:  the  GDR's 
trade with  the  Soviet Union  is worth "DM  14,000 million and  with  the  other  five 
East European countries  DM  16, TOO  million.) 
The  fact is that trade between  the  FRG  and  the  GDR  is steadily  increasing, 
l  and  the  future  outlook is g.ood. 
29.  The  flourishing  trade between  the  two  Germanies can be attributed to many 
factors,  including  the--fact that,  as  the most  industrialiied of the 
COMECON  countries,  the  GDR  supplies  fairly high-quality manufactured 
products  in  exchange  for  its imports  from  the west,  its indebtedness  vis-
a-vis  the west  is relatively low  and it enjoys very  favourable  credit terms 
in west  Germany. 
According  t·,o the  Commission  of the  li:uropean  communities,  the  quantity 
of East  German  products  imported  duty-free  into west  Germany  under  the 
German  internal  trade  system and  subsequently re-exported ·to other  Cozruinmi ty 
member  states is only  small:  DM  44  million,  out of total imports  from 
East  Germany  of  DM  4,066 million  and  compared with the total  of west  Germany's 
exports  to the other  EEC  Member  States  of  DM  130,566 million. 
It should be  noted,  however,  that  the  above  statistics are  supplied by 
west  Germany,  as  there are no  Community  checks  on  this area. 
30.  Some  Member  States feel  that these calculations  should not  only  include 
East European  products  that are re-exported  - in order  to evaluate  the 
effect of German  internal  trade  on  community  trade  - but  should also take 
account  of  the  loss of profit,  since  in certain cases  community  products 
could be  substituted for  East  European  products  imported via west  Germany. 
Despite  the  fact  that  under Articles  2  and  3  of  the  Protocol .each  Member 
State  may  take  appropriate measures  to prevent  any difficulties arising for 
it from  German  internal trade,  greater  Community  surveillance  and vigilance 
is highly desirable if abuses  are to be eliminated. 
1 
Example:  The  GDR  is highly  interested in  long-term contracts with  large 
chemical,  metallurgical and ceramic  undertakings and  the glass 
industry  in  the Federal Republic  of  Germany~  the  latest five-year 
plan  may  well herald closer  links between  the  GDR's  nationalized 
industries and  the heavy  industries along  the  Rhine  and  Ruhr. 
- 25  - PE  68.466/fin. A  positive feature,  however,  is the  fact  that the  EEC  is tending .to  look 
upon  the  GDR  more  and  more  as  a  third country,  with all that this  implies, 
1 
not  least for  the Federal  Republic. 
d.  Questions  in connection with· 'trade  in agricultural  eroducts 
31.  so  far  there  have  been  few  problems with a·gricu-ltur.al products,  since 
products  from  COMECON  countries are treated in the  same  way as  those  from 
other  third countries  in that the rules  of  the  common  agricultural policy are 
applied  in full.  In fact,  if anything,  it is the East European countries 
that complain about  our  Common  Agricultural Policy,  as  the fairly protection-
istic nature  of  the CAP  is  a  considerable obstacle to their exports  of 
agricultural products  (which,  after all, account  for  an  important  share 
of  COMECON's  exports to the Community)  and as  they find it hard  to  a~cept 
that products  from  developing  countries should be  given preferential treat-
ment.  Even  so,  their dissatisfaction is by no  means  entirely justified seeing 
that  they also benefit  from  low-price  sales of  products  when  there is a  large 
surplus  (for instance,  butter sales  to  the  USSR). 
There  is also the fact  that a  number  of  COMECON  countries regularly 
suffer  from  shortages  of certain agricultural products  and  therefore  the 
commission  should  look  carefully at ways  of  making  optimum use  aE  East 
European  markets without according  the countries  concerned special preferences 
and without  adversely affecting the Common  Agricultural Policy. 
e.  The  trade  embargo  problem 
32.  The  embargo  problem  is not  a  new  on2.  The  embargo  policy  instrument, 
COCOM,  the  prime  aim  of  which  is to stop  the  export  of  strategic goods  to the 
Soviet  Union,  dates  from  1947. 
The  Member  States of  COCOM  (Coordination Committee)  - which  was  formally 
instituted on  1  January  1950  - are  the  same  as  those  of  NATO  with  the  exception 
of  Iceland and  Japan.  Since its original version the  embargo  list of goods 
corresponding  to given criteria has  often been  amended  and adjusted. 
In  recent years,  however,  there has been  some  displeasure about  the 
existence  of  this list.  Most  of  the criticism has been  from American 
industry  which has claimed  that  the  COCOM  system is very detrimental to  the 
American  economy,  that  the  embargo list is inefficient and  out-of-date and 
that  the  embargo is  only  too  often circumvented by  firms  from  other 
industrialized countries. 
1  Example:  The  EEC  has  decided  to consider  East. German  steel  products  sold 
in  the West  as  originating  from  third countries and  not as  a 
German  internal  product as  used  to be  the case.  (Financial  Times, 
31  December  1977). 
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system,  certain sources believe  that this would  deal  a  heavy  blow  to certain 
European  industries  since  some  major  European contracts with  the  Eastern bloc 
would  never  have been concluded without  the  enforced absence  of  American 
competition. 
33.  From  a  more general  point  of view  one could question  the advisability  of 
an  embargo policy at all. 
Often  an  embargo fails to attain its intended goal.  Earlier  examples  show 
that an  embargo directed against  a  particular country have  often ·encouraged 
that country  to consolidate its potential productivity.  It could also be  asked 
whether  it might  not be  more  efficient to make  the  party which  is the  target 
of  the  embargo  more,  rather  than  less,  dependent since  this wuuld also reduce 
the  danger  of an  open conflict  situation. 
With  regard  to the  European  embargo  problem,  the  EEC  Council declared 
on  15  January  1980,  following  the Russian  invasion  of Afghanistan  and  the 
consequent American  wheat  embargo,  that  the commission  must  take  the  necessary 
steps  to ensure  that it was  not circumvented by  EEC  food  deliveries  to the 
Soviet  Union.  Subsequently  the  Community  promised  the  United .States that it 
would  only  maintain  the conventional current trade relations with  the  USSR. 
As  the  US  embargo  ought  not  to be circumvented by  EC  exports,  the Commission 
should  - in the  opinion  of  the rapporteur  - tighten  up  its checks  on  the 
destination  of  products,  as it already has  done  in  the case  o£  butter and 
wheat  sales.  It should also be  noted  that the  impact  of  a  U~ embargo  is not 
the  same  as  that  of  a  European  embargo  sine~ Europe has more  dependent  trade 
relations with  the  Eastern bloc  than her Atlantic allies. 
Consequently,  although agreement  may  be recorded  to the  principle  of  an 
embargo  policy,  the  European  Community  should avoid making it so strict that 
it might  harm  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy  or  the  European consumer. 
f.  The  problem  of  Eastern European  debts 
34.  Since  the  second half  of  the  sixties trade  between  the  EEC  and  Eastern 
Europe has  progressed  satisfactorily and  kept  pace with  the general develop-
ment  of  the  Common  Market's  international  trade  relations.  There  are however 
possible changes  on  the  way,  partly as a  result of  the  economic  situation in 
the West  and  partly as  a  result  of  the constant growth  of  the .Eastern 
European countries'  debts  to the  industriaLized countr'ies.  'I'he  net debt  of 
the  Socialist countries whichwas only  US  $  6,000 million  in  1971  is put at 
US  $  64,600 million for  1979. 
'l'he  following  table  shows  the  growth  of  the  debt  positions  of  the  various 
Eastern European countries with regard  to  the West. 
- 27  - PE  68.466 /fin. CURRENCY  DEBT  OF  EASTERN  EUROPEAN  COUNTRI~Sl  =========================================== 
1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979 
Total 
Gross  8  357  11  047  14  965  22,317  36  401  47  661  56  577  68  947  77 •13'0 
Net  5,987  7  518  10,570  16,175  28  898  38  869  48  244  58,303  64  660 
Bu1oaria 
Gross  743  1  009  1,020  1  703  2,640  3  198  3,7CJ7  4  263  4  500  -
Net  723  909  997  1  360  2  257  2  756  3  169  3  710  3  730 
Czechoslovakia 
Gross  485  630  757  1  048  l, 132  1  862  2  616  3  206  4  020 
Net  160  176  273  640  827  1  434  2,121  2  513  3,070 
GDR 
Gross  1. 408  1  554  2  136  3  136  5,188  5  856  7  145  8  894  10  140 
Net  1  205  1  229  1  876  2  592  3,548  5  047  6.159  7  548  8,440 
Hunqarv 
Gross  1  091  1  3-92  1  442  2  129  3  135  4  049  5  655  7  473  8  020 
Net  848  1  055  l  096  1  537  2  195  2  852  4  491  6  532  7  320 
Poland 
Gross  1  138  1,564  2  796  4!643  8!014  11! 483  13.967  17,844  21,100 
Net  764  1  150  2  213  4,120  7  381  10  680  13  532  16.972  20  000 
Romania 
Gross  1  227  1,249  1  611  2  693  2  924  2,903  3  605  5  228  6  950 
Net  1  227  1  204  1,495  2  483  2,449  2  528  3  388'  4,992  6  700 
USSR 
Gross  1  107  2  409  3,749  5,176  10  573  14  853  15.728  17  227  17  200 
Net  582  555  1, 166  1  654  7  451  10  115  11,230  11  217  10  200 
Coroec on 
banks2  478  1,240  1  454  1  789  2,790  3  457  4  154  4  319  5  200 
(in  $  million) 
1  source:  'Estimated  Soviet and  East European  Hard  Currency  Debt' 
A  Research  Paper  - National Foreign Assessment Center, 
ER  80-10327,  June  1980 
2  International Investment  Bank 
International Bank  for  Economic  Cooperation 
These  are  the  two  banks  set  up  under  the auspices  of  COMECON 
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Western banks  and  31%  by  public  institutions.  Calculation  of  the debt 
repayment  ratio1  for  each  of  the  Eastern  European countries concerned gives 
the  follm~ing  J?ic ture: 
USSR  18% 
POLAND  92% 
GDR  54% 
HUNGARY  37% 
ROMANIA  22% 
BULGARIA  38% 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  22% 
35.  If we  bear  in  mind  that according  to criteria  OJ?erated  by  international 
banks,  a  debt  reJ?ayment  ratio of  more  than  30"/o  is too heavy  a  .burden,  we can 
see  that  Poiand  is in  an  unenviable  J?OSition.  The  USSR,  Romania  and 
Czechoslovakia can be  regarded as  normal  risks,  and  Hungary  and Bulgaria are 
somewhat  in excess  of  the generally  acceJ?ted  norms  but  in  the case  of  the 
GDR  and  particularly  Poland facilities will most  J?robably  have  to be granted 
in  the  future  which  perhaJ?s  run counter  to the  'OECD  Consensus'.  In  1980 
Poland will have  to find  US  $  7-8,000 million  to discharge  its currency  debts 
and  this can  only  be  done  by  refinancing  on  the  basis  of market  interest 
rates and  no  longer  on  favourable  interest  terms  since  this would conflict 
with  the  OECD  Consensus. 
Extension  of  payment  terms  is equally  impossible  since  the  maximum  finan...,· 
cing J?eriod is 8!.;, years.  In  our  DJ?inion  international concentration will be 
necessary  to find  a  solution  to this  problem. 
V.  The  importance  of  East-West  trade  - some  fundamental  points 
36.  In  view  of  the difficulties and  problems  involved  in establishing and 
maintaining  trade relations with Eastern bloc countries,  many people may wonder 
whether these  trade  ~elations are  in fact useful and desirable,  and  indeed 
whether  it is worthwhile  for  the Community  to  make  such efforts to intensify 
contacts if at the  same  time  it must  remain  vigilant and  fight  to prevent 
practices by Eastern bloc countries  that disturb the market. 
This  may  be  answered  as  follows: 
Despite  the considerable differences between  the  two  economic· entities, 
an  ayreement between  the community  and  COMECql)f  and  its member  states is 
des.  ~ble  on  both  political and  economic  grounds.  From  the political viewpoint 
1 
The  debt  repayment  ratio is obtained by  dividing  the currency capital and 
interest amounts  by  the  figure  for  currency  revenue  from  exJ?ort  transactions 
- 29  - PE  68.466/fin. - and  in the context  of  the Final Act  of Helsinki  - it is absurd  that the 
EEC  should  entertain  normal  trade relations with  every  country  in  the \•orld 
and  conclude  specific  agreements with  a  large  number  of  them,  while at the 
same  time its relations with its nearest neighbours have still to be 
normalized.  From  an  economic  viewpoint it is clear  that  many  trade contacts 
are continuing  to develop and  therefore it is  time  to establish  a  stable 
legal basis for  these reciprocal  economic  relations. 
37.  It can,  generally  speaking,  be  said that,  whatever  form  the reciprocal 
or  bilateral trade relations  take,  East-West  trade by  i·ts nature  offers con-
siderable advantages  to both  sides. 
The  facts  speak  for  themselves:  four-fifths  of East-West  trade is bal!i.ed 
on  agreements with European  countries  and  the EEC  countries account for 
around  two-thirds  of  these trade  ~elations between Eastern  and Western  Europe. 
In certain industrial  sectors  the COMECON  countries have become  the 
Nine's  largest customer;  one-fifth of  the  EEC
1 s  sales of  metal-worki~g 
machinery,  pipelines  and  sheet steel go  to  the  COMECON  countries1•  Moreover, 
the West  is  turning  more  and  more  to the  Soviet Union  and  Eastern Europe 
for  its supplies of natural gas,  oil,  uranium and other  important  raw materials. 
Even  under  the  highly  controvers~al  buy-bac~ ·aeals,West European  firms 
can  supply industrial plant  to East European  countries  and  in exchange  have 
products  manufactured  more  cheaply than.·in their  own  country.  In many  cases 
the  transfer  of  technology  is  considered as  the price  the West  has  to pay 
in  order  to acquire  new  markets,  which  is  a  great advantage  of  industrial 
cooperation  for  the West.  ~lso,  more  and  more Western  concerns  are investing 
in Eastern Europe  in the  hope  that their  cooperation with  COMECON  countries 
will give  them  a  foothold  in the ·rhird World markets  from whic:h  they have 
hitherto been  excluded.  Indeed,  tripartite agreements  involving  an  OECD 
country,  a  COMECON  country and  a  developing  country are becoming  more  and 
more  frequent. 
38.  Imports  of Western  technology and plant have  played an  important role 
in the  industrial development  of  the Eastern bloc  countries  over  the past 
ten years.  The  growth  of  East-West  trade has  enabled  them to diversify their 
imports  and  exports  and  thereby gain more  freedom  of  movement  vis-a·-v,d.s 
the  Soviet Union. 
1  Manufactured  and  semi-manufactured goods  account  for  more  than  90%  of 
Community  sales to COMECON,  40%  of  COMECON's  imports  from  the  Community 
consist  of  machinery  and capital goods.  In recent years  the  share  of 
consumer  goods  in COMECON's  overall  imports  from  the Community  has also 
risen;  the  main  products  being agricultural and  food  products;  sales 
are  effected  on  the  basis  of  long-term contracts 
- 30  - PE  68. 466/fin. These  few  advantages  underline  the  importance  of  East-West  economic 
relations and  show  that - in spite  of  the  various  drawbacks  - a  reasonable 
and rational approach  towards East-West  trade can benefit both ·sides. 
VI.  The  oil crisis and  the  COMECON  countries1 
39.  What  have  been  the consequences  of  the  oil crisis for  the  COMECON 
countries  and  its repercussions  on  East-west  relations? 
-With the  exception  of Poland with frs  coal  industry  and Romania with 
its oil  and  gas  reserves,  the East European  countries  look primarily 
to  the  Soviet Union  for  their energy supplies2• 
As  a  result,  the  economic  dependence  of these  countries  on  the Soviet 
Union  is  growing. 
And  the need  to secure  the  supplies of energy  and  raw materials which 
are crucial ·to their  future  development will  induce  COMECON  member  states 
to invest more  and  more  in major  projects in the Soviet Union  and thereby 
fulfil  the USSR's  desire for  more  planning- and,  particularly,  more 
energy planning  - within  the  COMECON  organization.  Because  of its 
abundant oil reserves,  the ·usSR •·s- trading  position is  steadily  improving; 
for  instance it has been able  to cut its trade deficit with  the  indus-
trialized· western  nations  from  $3,350 mill-ion  to $1,130 million.  In an 
effort to boost its revenue  from  oil exports still further,  the  USSR  has 
increased its exports while at the· same  time  keeping closely in "line with 
OPEC  price  increases. 
The  trading position of the  other Eastern bloc countries,  on  the 
other hand,  has worsened  as  a  result,  since  they need  to pay part 
of their growing  oil bill in  foreign  currency. 
- Furthermore,  it is already clear that recourse will have to be 
made  more  and  more  to  imports  of oil·fr,am the ·Gulf  States. 
1 
"2 
What  problems  does1 this create  for  the  East  European  countries? 
First,  it makes  their  need  for hard  currency all  the  more  acute. 
§~~~=~~  'De  Financieel  en  Economische  Tijd' (Belgian daily  newspaper) 
- 'The  effects  of  Energy  Development  on  East  European  Economic 
Prospects'  by  Tony_  Seaulan.  Nato  colloquium 1980. 
Si1  1974  the  USSR  has been  the world's  mai~  -;;i_i_p~-oduc~r  and-t~a:dit·i-~~~lly 
exports  20  - 29%  of its output.  Soviet exports  of crude oil to western 
Europe  rose last year by  17%,  while those  to Eastern Europe  rose by only 
2%.  In  spite of this,  the lion's share,  namely  75.3  million tonnes 
still "-'(·mt  to  COMECON  countries.  69.2  million tonnes went  to western 
Europe. 
- 3.r  - PE  68.466/fin. Eastern  Europe will  therefore try  to  use  as  little hard currency as 
~ossible and  ~ay instead in kind with machines,  factories,  chemicals and, 
in  some cases,  agricultural  f>roducts.  However,  the  ~rablem is that it will 
be difficult for  Eastern  Europe  to find  products  in which  the  oil-exporting 
countries are interested;  for  they are already  exporting  their best products 
to  Europe  in  exchange  for  essential Western  technology  and  so as  to reduce 
their  indebtedness. 
40.  It is to be  expected,  therefore,  that  the  COMECON  countries will,  on 
the  one  hand,  continue  to cut  down  their imports  from  the West  il'l  order 
to pay  for  their expensive oil and,  on  the  other hand,  will  stew  u.p 
their exports  to the West  in  order  to obtain  the vital  foreign exchange. 
Finally,  the growing  scarcity and rising cost of  raw  mat\erials: bode ill 
for  the  economic growth  of the East  European countries. 
4l.  Because  of  the  need to export,  there is little room  for  inve~t:raent :pr_ 
for  improvement  of living standards  i!'l  Eastern  Europe  itself. 
- In  short,  the  impact  of  the energy crisis on  ~OMECON countries is such  that 
either: 
- they will be  obliged to collaborate in joint COMECON  proj~ftS 
under  the leadership of the  Soviet Union;  they will  try to 
conclude  more  compensation  agreements with the Soviet Union 
or; 
(on  the lines  of  the  Orenburg  gas  project,  and  the :Khmelnitsky 
(Ukraine)  nuclear  power  station),  but~~n  tn~~ field  tney 
will come  into competition .with···non-COMECON countries: 
- they will  have to obtain more  credit -- either  from  the west 
or  from  the  Soviet Union  - to keep  up with  the rise in prices 
of  raw  materials  (the  Soviet Union  has  already granted loans 
to  every country  in  the Eastern bloc). 
or; 
I 
they will  try - again  in  competition with western  countries 
to export their existing technology  and products  to the 
developing countries  in  exchange  for  e~~rgy supplies. 
- ~2  - PE  68. 466/fin .-VII.  Future prospects 
42.  When  looking at the various  forms  of  trade relations between the Community 
and  COMECON  and/or  its members,  we  must  also consider prospects  for  the future. 
Up  to  now,  trade between  the Community  and  state-trading countries  has  developed 
satisfactorily and  in  the  1970s particularly there was  a  marked  expansion 
in East-West  trade1.  H9wever,  a  slowing  down  in East-West  trade is now 
generally expected  in what  has  actuauy been  a  record year.  In  1979,  overall 
East-West  trade was  23%  up  on  1978.  Exports  from  OECD  countries rose by 
around  17%  to  $38,000  millimo;,while  imports  from Eastern Europe  rose  •by  around 
.-mf'-third  to  $35,000 million.  At  the· same  time,_ the  total  indebtedness  of 
4l  -
COMECON  countries via-a-vis the  west  reached  $65,000 million· ·at 'the  end  of  1979 
i.e.  an  increase  of  $6,000million  (or  10.2%)  over  19782. 




recent  tensions  in international politics are  thought  to  have  cast a  shadow 
over  future  trade _prospects;, 
the depression of  1975  and  relative weakening  of the European  economies 
have  reduced  the import  capacity of  European  countries; 
there was  a  definite decline  in  economic activity in the East European 
countries during  tha second half of the  70s  and  none  of  the  countries 
concerned is expected to reach  the  target of  6.3%  growth set in  the 
1976-80  five-year plans; 
the  protectioni~attitude of  the EEC  vis-a-vis all other  countries. 
In  1966  61%  of  our  imp~ts from  the Eastern bloc came  from three  of  the  ten 
product  categories  used to classify international trade;  in  1977  the 
percentage  fell to  38.9%.  The  goods  in question are  from  our  traditional 
wanufacturing  industries,  which  have  become particularly vulnerable in 
recent years; 
the privileged relations which  the.EEC  has  establ~shed with  the  three 
new  applicant countries,  the Mediterranean countries,  the  ex-EFTA  countries 
and  the ACP  countries,  have  had  a  trade-diver~ing effect by giving preference 
to  exports  from  these  countries at the  expense  of  the East European countries  ... 
Total  exports  and  imports  between  industrialized countries and  the Eastern 
bloc rose  from  $15,000  million in  1970  to  more  than  $73,000 million in 
1979;  the rapid growth  in  imports  of Western  capital goods  and  technology 
by  the  COMECON  countries was  the main  ·driVing force behind the rapid 
'  ·oansion  of East-West  trade. 
':Lwo-thirds  of  the debts  of  the  East European  countries are with Western 
commercial  banks  and  one-third with  government  and semi-state bodies 
(Poland  is by far  tl'e largest debtor  in  the Eastern bloc with debts  of 
$18,500 million). 
- 33  - PE  68.466/fin. The  industrialization of  certain Third World countries, which normally 
concentrate  on  the  manufacture  of  semi-finished products,  and  the emergence 
of  'workshop'  countries,  where  wage  levels are four  time  lower  than in the 
Socialist countries,  have  had  the.  same  effect; 
faced with their worsening  trode balance  and  growing foreign  debt,  the 
Socialist countries  have  taken  a  series of measures  to remedy  a  situation 
which was  threatening to become critical.  In the meantime,  however,  they 
have  also put  a  brake  on  the development of East-West relations; 
finally,  a  very  important  factor  is  the effect of  the energy crisis 
on  East-West relations.  According  to the Austriar, Institute 
for  Comparative Economic  Studies,  in order  to pay for  their oil the 
member  states of  COivlECON  will have  to direct more  and  more  of  their 
exports  towards  the Soviet Union,which  could  then  prevent Eastern ol.oc 
countries  from  developing  their economic relations with the West  (Le  MondG, 
25. 4. 80) • 
44.  The  general  outlook is as follows:  b~ause of  t'he cmmcoN c·ountr·ie-s'· 
growing  indebtedness  (with  the  excel?tion  of  the  Soviet Union)  their  economic 
policy will be  directed  towards ex?ort-oriented growth  over  the  next  few  years. 
This  policy will have  repercussions  on  the  level  of  their  imports,  particularly 
that  of capital goods  from  the West,  and  demand will be mainly  for  goods  and 
technology  that can  promote  economies  in  raw  materials and  energy.  The 
future  development  of  COMECON  cooperation must  therefore be  seen against this 
background. 
VITI.  conclusions 
'··45.  To  sum  up,  the following  conclusions may  be drawn.  Your  rapporteur 
feels  that the commission  should be congratulated for  the cautious and 
sensible manner  in which it has conducted its negotiations with COMECON. 
One  cannot  stress strongly  enough  that any  agreement with state-trading 
countries,  and  in !?articular with  COMECON  as an  organization,  must  include 
reciprocity  in  some  form  or  another.  This means  that  the  Community  does  not 
intend  to grant development aid  in whatever  form  to East-European  industries 
or  to the  Soviet Union.  In this respect the Commission's  demands  in connection 
with  the  text  of  the  preamble are crucial to the conclusion  of an  agreement. 
At  the  same  time  the Community  must  ~ever accept  that a  particular 
agreement with  COMECON  as  an  org~nization should  take  precedence  over agree-
ments  between  the  Community  and  the  industrialized COMECON  countries.  Any 
such  solution  is unacceptable  to us  on  legal,  political and  economic  grounds. 
- 34  - PE  68.466/fin. 46.  It is not  possible  legally because  COMECON  has  no  supra-national  powers  -
nor,  for  political reasons,  would  we  wish it to;  from  the  political angle 
such  a  course  of  events would be most  undesirable  since it would help to 
strengthen  the  Soviet Union's grip  on  the East European countries,  and that 
is not  our  aim. 
47.  From an  economic  viewpoint  such  a  priority may  be  equally  unacceptable, 
given  the considerable differences between  the respective  structures and  the 
various  economic  links between  the  European  Community  and its individual Member 
States.  Here  again we  ar~ opposed  to  the  individual COMECON  countries 
becoming  too  economically dependent  on  the  Soviet Union.  Lastly,  it should 
not  be  forgotten  that,  in spite of  the COMECON-EEC  dialogue,  some  members  of 
COMECON  are  already  standing  up  for  their  own  economic  interests by establishing 
individual relations with the community  outside the  jurisdiction of  COMECON. 
48.  The  rapporteur considers that the  EEC  .uust  give  priority to separate  trade 
agreements with  individual COMECON  trading partners.  The  main  argument  in 
support  of  this view is that agreements  that promote  trade itself can  and 
must  be  concluded with  the COMECON  countries  individually.  Bilateral agreements 
of  this kind take account  of  the intrinsic characteristics and  requ~ements 
of  each  country;  for,  although these contaats are with state-trading countries, 
there are considerable differences between their respective  systems.  Our 
contacts  must  take account  of  this and  must  ultimately satisfy the economic 
needs  of  each  individual COMECON  member,  needs  which must at the. same  time 
be  compl~ntary  to our  own  Community  requirements.  Over  the past ten years 
a  number  of  economic  links have  been  established between East  and West  which 
we  have  no wish  to abandon,  given  that this would  entail disadvantages  for 
all concerned.  The  disadvantages  would  be considerably greater  for  the  s~11 
COMECON  and  West  European  countries  than  for  the  USSR  and  the USA.  Lastly, 
it should be  stressed that economic policy is the only field in which East 
European countries enjoy  a  certain autonomy  and are  less  subject to Soviet 
influence. 
49.  This  does  not mean  that the EuiOpean  Community  should approach negotiations 
with COMECON  as  an organization with any  leas resolve;  in  the  view ·of  the  EP, 
however,· it must give  priority  to agre,ements  with  the individual coun·tries, 
but  in  such  a  way  that  these relati6i1; do not adversely affect our  industries 
and  EEC  markets.  Your  rapporteur hopes,  therefore,  that the Commission will 
intensify its trade relations with  the  individual  East  European countries 
and will take great care that certain practices referred to above  are curbed 
or  stopped completely. 
In cone lusion: 
- 35 - PE  68.466/fin. - the autonomous  import  policy  needs  to be  supplemented  by  realistic Community 
lists of  liberalized  p£oducts: 
- a  common  export  policy  should be  framed  which  would  provide  for  the 
promotion  of  our  agricultural  exports  and  an  effective common credit policy; 
- stricter measures  are needed  to counteract dumping: 
- a  proper  Community  monitoring  system must be  set up  to Keep  trade between 
East and West  Germany  within agreed  limits and, 
- if possible  a  code  of conduct  for  'compensation'  agreements  should be 
drawn  up. 
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Publication  in  the Russian  periodical  KOMMUNIST  of  '17  propositions 
on  the Common  Market'  formulating  the  ideological bases  of Russian 
opposition to European  union. 
Publication  in  PRAVDA  of  the  '32  propositions  on  imperialist 
integration in Western Europe'  containing  sharp criticism of  the 
European Communities while at the  same  time  noting  that the 
existence  of  the  EEC  does not imply cooperation between  the existing 
economic  blocs in Europe. 
Following  a  soviet  'aide-memoire'  on  tariff reductions,  the 
Community  declares that it desires a  normalization  df  relations. 
- 1972,  March  and December 
Declaration by Mr  Brezhnev  on  the recognition of  'realities'  in 
Europe. 
- October  1972 
The  meeting  of  Heads  of  state and  Government  of  the  EEC  expresses 
its readiness  to encourage  a  policy of cooperation with  the Eastern 
European countries. 
- July  1973 
COMECON  approaches  the  EEC  and declares its desire for  closer 
contacts. 
- May  1974 
The  Council  of  the  EEC  declares that the Community  is prepared  to 
negotiate  on  trade agreements with  each  of  the Eastern European 
countries,  taking  account  of  the realization of  the  EEC's  common 
commercial  policy. 
- September  1974 
Mr F adeyev,  Secretary  of  COMECON,  invites President Ortoli to visit 
Moscow  to discuss relations between  the  two  organizations.  Mr 
Ortoli accepts  in principle and  immediately  proposes  that preparatory 
talks should be  started at official level. 
- November  1974 
Following  up  the declaration of <May  1974  the Commission  forwards 
an  outline  trade agreement  to the  Eastern European states. 
- 4-6  February  1975 
First talks in Moscow  between  a  delegation  from  the Commission  and 
a  delegation  from  the  COMECON  secretariat.  Both delegations agree 
that the  talks should be continued. 
- 3 7  - PE  68.466,~in./Ann.  I - 16  February  1976 
Mr  G.  Thorn  (President  of  the Council  of  Ministers)  receives a 
message  from  Mr  G.  Weiss  (President  of  the Executive committee  of 
COMECON). 
COMECON  puts  forward  a  proposal for  a  conclusion  of  a  framework 
cooperation agreement  h:-';:·  •. ~lm the  EEC  (and  Member  States)  and 
COMECON  (and  Member  States)  known  as  the Weiss  proposal.  The 
bulk  of  the  proposal concerns  the commitments  to be  entered  into 
by  the  Member  States  of both  organizations as regards mutual  trade 
relations. 
- 17  November  1976 
The  Community  (the Council)  replies with  a  letter and  a  proposal 
for  a  draft agreement  to Mr  Olszewski,  President  of  the  Executive 
Committee  of  COMLCON.  This  proposal provides  for  the institution 
of  working  relations between  the  two  organizations  (the  exchange  of 
information  on  general subjects  such as economic  prospects,  production 
and consumption,  trade statistics,  standardization and  management 
of  the  environment),  and  for  the  trade aspects  to be regulated by 
bilateral agreements between  the  Community  and  the  individual COMECON 
countries. 
The  Community  expresses its readiness  to enter into negotiations 
immediately. 
- 18 April  1977 
Mr  K.  Olszewski  (President  of  the  Executive Committee  of COMECON) 
proposes an  exchange  of  views  with  the President of  the Council  of 
Ministers  on  the  form  future  talks  should  take. 
- 25  July  1977 
Mr  Simonet,  President  of  the Council  of Ministers,  accepts  the 
pr9posal  for  a  meeting  and  proposes  that Mr  Haferkamp  take charge 
of  negotiations with  COMECON. 
- 21  September  1977 
The  proposed meeting  in held  in Brussels.  COMECON's  representative 
is Mr  Marinescu,  Vice-Premier  of  Romania  and  President  of  the 
Executive  Committee  of  COMECON.  ,. 
Both  parties agree  to enter  into negotiations with  the aim  of 
concluding  an  agreement between  the  two  organizations during  the 
first half  of  1978. 
- March/April  1978 
Decision  for  Mr  Haferkamp  to have  a  meeting with  Mr  Fadeyev. 
- 38  - PE  68.466/fin./Ann.  I - 29  and  30  May  1978 
Meeting  between  Mr  Haferkamp  (Vice-President  of  the Commission  of 
the  European Communities}  and  Mr  Nikolai Fadeyev  (Secretary-General 
of  COMECON)  in Moscow. 
Agreement between  the parties  on  a  number  of points set  out  in an 
annexed  memorandum;  the eventual agreement  to stipulate that each 
party must  re!'lpect  the practices,  objectives and  institutional 
rules of the  other party and  that each party  should negotiate in 
accordance with its own  internal procedure. 
- 25  and  28  July  1978 
Meeting  of  experts  in Brussels. 
The  delegation  of experts  from  the Secretariat of  COMECON  and  the 
individual Member  States  led by  Mr  Velkev  and  the delegation  from 
the Community  led by  Sir Roy  Denman  proceed  to an  exchange  of views 
on  the  area  of application and  the  provisions  of  a  cooperation 
agreement. 
- 22  and  25  November  1978 
Meeting  in Brussels between Mr Fadeyev  and  Mr  ~aferkamp.  In a 
personal initiative the  latter makes  a  compromise  proposal con-
cerning  the  parties to  such an agreement and  the provisions relating 
to trade.  His  proposal goes as far as  the  EEC  is prepared  to go. 
Mr  Fadeyev  promises a  reply  by  February  1979. 
- 22  March  1979 
Mr  Katushev,  President  of  the Executive Committee  of  COMECON,  delivers 
to  the French  Embassy  a  letter addressed to Mr  Fran~ois-Poncet, 
President  of  the Council  of  the-EEC,  repeating COMECON's  proposals. 
A  new  meeting  is proposed. 
- 10  May  1979 
Mr  Haferkamp  replies to this letter. 
He  accepts  the  suggestion  of another meeting but states that 
COMECON  should first reply  to his proposal. 
The  letter also points out that ),etters should be addressed to  the 
Commission  of  the  EEC  as  the body  responsible  for  conducting  the 
negotiations. 
- 2  July  1979 
Letter  from  Mr  Fadeyev. 
- 39  - PE  68.466/fin./Ann.  I Mr  Haferkamp's  letter ignored:  COMECON  proposes  a  new  text.  The 
COMECON  proposal  is virtually  identical in content to its earlier 
proposals. 
Invitation  tc hold  the  next meeting  in Moscow. 
- 26  to  28  November  1979 
Meeting at political  level in Moscow. 
_  exchange  of views  on  existing draft agreements;  the  EEC  submits 
a  new  proposal; 
- negotiations not concluded; 
_  decision  that further  formulation  of  a  draft shall be carried out 
by  a  group  of  experts  in Geneva  (February-March  1980) ; 
_  need  to discuss again  a  number  of  fundamental  issues at political 
level; 
- the  EEC  unable  to accept  that  commercial problems 
be  covered by  an  outline agreement;  but no  objection 
to  including most-favoured nation clause.  COMECON 
has  no  common  commercial policy  and  therefore  no 
negotiations with  COMECON  possible  on  this question: 
such  agreements  to be  concluded with its member 
states  individually; 
- the  EEC  unable  to accept that the  agreement  cover 
industrial,  technological  and scientific cooperation; 
- the  EEC  unable  to accept that individual Member 
States  of  the Community also be parties to the 
agreement; 
- the  EEC  opposed  to setting up  of  a  joint committee 
with general powers  to discuss  aspects of  mutual 
relations. 
P.S.  The  EEC  does  not reject the  most-favoured 
nation  clause  as  such,  but simply opposes  the 
inclusion  of  this clause in  the outline agree-
ment;  is prepared,  however,  to include it in 
bilateral agreements  with the  individual 
members  of  COMECON. 
- a  reference  to  the  importance  of  trade between  the 
two parties  included  in  the preamble  to its draft 
agreement; 
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promote  and  develop  mutual  trade and  no  member  of 
COMECON  obliged  to conduct  trade negotiations with 
the EEC  if unwilling  to do  so; 
- the member  states of  COMECON,  as well as  COMECON 
itself,  may  be parties  to the  agreement. 
- December  1979 
'Haferkamp returns satisfied from Moscow'. 
P.S.  So  far  no  progress made. 
- March  1980 
Meeting  of  experts in Geneva. 
- 31  March  1980 
Statement by  Mr  Haferkamp:  'No more  top-level contacts between 
the community  and  COMECON'. 
- Mr  Haferkamp  wishes,  however,  to continue technical contacts 
between  officials  (in  the hope  of  this leading  to £resh contacts 
at top  level); 
- Mr  Haferkamp  emphasizes,  however,  the Community's  willingness 
to conclude an  agreement with  COMECON. 
- 16  July  1980 
Resumption  of  EEC-COMECON  talks at expert  level in Geneva. 
Result:  the parties return home  once  again without accomplishing 
their  object:  no agreement  reached. 
- 15  and  17  October  1980 
Meeting  of  experts in Geneva. 
Little progress  on  fundamental  differences. 
The  EEC  delegation  proposes  the  organization  of  a  further  meeting 
in January  1981.  This meeting  to take account  of  the results of 
the CSCE  meeting  in Madrid  (November  1980). 
Present situation:  Totally divergent views held by  both parties  on  the 
nature  of  a  future agreement. 
COMECON  wants  the agieement  to regulate directly  trade relations between  the 
two  organizations. 
- 41  -The  EEC's  opposition to this is well known:  there can be  no  question  of  a 
trade  agreement  between  the Community  and  COMECON  since: 
- the  degree  of  integration and  the  powers  of  COMECON  bear  no comparison 
with  those  of  the Community,  and 
-COMECON's  powers,  particularly as  regards  trade,  are altogether different 
from  those  of  the  European  C  wn~Ttuni  ty. 
Moreover,  the  EEC  will not contemplate  a  Joint Committee  set  up  by  COMECON 
to supervise  the  implementation  of  the agreement. 
The  Community  IS  prepared to conclude bilateral trade agreements with any 
member  of  COMECON  (as it already has done,  for  instance,  with Romania).  The 
EEC  also requires that the agreement apply  to West  Berlin and be  signed by 
the Community  as  such. 
COMECON  refuses  to countenance  the  above  stipulations. 
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26. 3. 1975 
31.8.1974 
20.2.1975  initialled,  signed 6.10.1975 
22.11.1973  and Five-year Agreement  from  10.4.1975 
27.5.1976 
10.10.1967  du~ation unspecified,  supplemented by 
agreement  of  10.9.1975 
19. 11. 1974 
11. 10.1977 
26. 11. 1979 




























30.10.1974  (supplementary  agreement) 
24.10.1979 
22.4.1975 
21. 2. 1974 
14.2.1976 
20. 11. 1974 





13.11.1974  and  Five-Year Agreement  from  19.3.1975 
19.7.1973 
11.7.1975  (supplementary  agreement) 
9. ll.  l97t~ 































5.10.1972 and  Five-Year Agreement  from  1975 
28.7.1975 
23.2.1970 
Nov.  1977  (supplementary  agreement) 
27. 10. 1971 
9. ll.  1974 
6. 12. 1974  (supplementary  agreement)  10 years 






21.3.1972  duration  unspecified 
20.3.1973 
16.12.1976  for  five years 
15.6.1972 for  five years 
8.9.1972  for  five years 
6.5.1974 
4.3.1979 
27.5.1974 and Five-Year Agreement  from  23.6.1975 
18.4.1973 
25.5.1974 
17.1.1974  (long-term programme) 
28.10.1975  agreement for  1980-1984 
22.5.1973 
30.4.1970 duration  unspecified 
25.7.1974 







19. 11. 1975 
15. 7. 1975 
11.10.1979  (draft) 
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Poland 
USSR 
13.6.1977  for  ten years 
16. 12. 1976 
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(in million  EUA) 
1978  1979  INDEX 
USSR  6,473  8,407  130 
GDR  642  718  112 
POLAND  2,256  2,442  108 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  1,093  1,286  118 
HUNGARY  1,012  1,260  125 
ROMANIA  l, 073  1,586  148 
BULGARIA  289  408  141 
ALBANIA  23  48  209 
~  12,861  16,155  126 
%  of  EEC  EXTERNAL  TRADE  7.2  7.4 
CHINA  937  1,324  141 
1  Excluding  intra-German  trade 
2  Source:  OECD.  Monthly  bulletin 3/1979  and  telephone communication 
Luxembourg 
- 46  - PE  68 .469/fin./Ann.  III COMMUNITY  IMPORTS  FROM  EASTERN  EUROPEAN  COUNTRIES  AND  CHINA  1979-1980 
(first 6  months) 
(in million EUA) 
1979  1980  INDEX 
USSR  3,327  4,730  142 
GDR  306  411  134 
POLAND  1,102  1,444  131 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  589  733  124 
HUNGARY  571  661  116 
ROMANIA  652  817  125 
BULGARIA  178  194  109 
ALBANIA  22  26  108 
TOTAL  6,747  9,016  134 
% of  EEC  EXTERNAL  TRADE  6.7  6.6 
CHINA  568  869  153 
Sources:  OECD.  Monthly  bulletin 3/1979  and  telephone communication  Luxeniliourg 
- 47  ,...  PE  68.466/fin./Ann.  II-I ANNEX  IV 
EXPORTS  FROM  EEC  MEMBER  STATES  TO  EASTERN  EUROPEA.N  COUNTRTES  AND  CHINA l, 
2 
(1978-1979) 
(in million EUA) 
1978  1979  INDEX 
USSR  5,632  6,310  112 
GDR  536  745  139 
POLAND  2,509  2,479  99 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  1, 211  1,277  105 
HUNGARY  1,545  1,478  96 
ROMANIA  1,421  1,744  123 
BULGARIA  539  599  lll 
ALBANIA  32  40  125 
~  13,425  14,672  109 
% of  EEC  EXTERNAL  TRADE  7.7  7.6 
CHINA  1,489  2,101  141 
1  Excluding  intra-German  trade 
2  Source:  OECD.  Monthly  bulletin 3/1979  and  telephone communication 
Luxembourg 
- 48  - PE  68.466/fin./Aim:.  IV COMMUNITY  EXPORTS  TO  EASTERN  EUROPEAN  COUNTRIES  AND  CHINA  1979-1980 
(first 6  months) 
(in million ""EUA) 
1979  l980  INDEX 
USSR  3,049  3,753  123 
GDR  362  404  112 
POLAND  1,206  1;478  123 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  559  633  113  \ 
HUNGARY  749  767  102 
ROMANIA  909  875  96 
BULGARIA  273  337  123 
ALBANIA  13  22  169 
TOTAL  7,120  8, 269  116 
% of  EEC  EXTERNAL  TRADE  7.7  7.6 
CHINA  1,062  809  76 
Sources:  OECD.  Monthly bulletin 3/1979 and  telephone communication  Luxerobourg 
-'  ~  . 
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DEVELOPMENT  OF  EEC  EXTERNAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  EASTERN  EUROPEAN  S~TE~TRADING 
COUNTRIES 
(in million EUA) 
Total  volume  of  EEC  external  tcade with  the 
COMECON  countries 
Year  Value  Percentage growth 
19581  1,910  -
1960  2, in  +  45 
1963  3,490  +  26 
1966  3,814  +  38 
1967  5,537  +  15 
1968  6,010  +  9 
1969  6,755  +  12 
1970  7,590  +  12 
1971  7,988  +  5 
1972  9,409  +  18 
1973  12,413  +  32 
1974  17,991  +  45 
1975  20,196  +  12 
1976  23,854  -+  !8 
19772  25,527  +  7 
1978  26, 286  +  2o'··9 
'1979  30,827  +  17.2 
1  Source:  Eurostat,  monthly bulletin - external  trade  - special number 
1958-1976,  pp.  12  and  13 
2  Source:  OECD.  Monthly  bulletin on  external trade 
1•2  Excluding  intra-German  trade 
- 50  - PE  68.466/fin./Ann, V  .. ANNEX  VI  (A) 
BALANCE  OF  TRADE 
between  the  Euro~ean Community  and  the Eastern  Euro~ean countries 
(and  China)  (1976-1979)  (by  country) 
1976  1977  1978  1979 
USSR  -358  -347  -541  -2,097 
GDR  - 26  -ll5  -106  27 
POLAND  860  15  253  37 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  249  164  ll8  -9 
HUNGARY  204  333  533  218 
ROMANIA  3  185  349  158 
BULGARIA  318  280  250  191 
ALBANIA  3  10  9  -8 
EUROPE  TOTAL  1,253  +925  +565  -1,483 




- 51  - PE  68 .466/fin  ./Ann.  VI USSR 
GDR 
POLAND 
Balance  of  trade between  the  Community  and 
the Eastern European countries and China 
1979-1980  (first 6  months) 
1979 
- 278 
+  56 
+  104 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  - 30 
HUNGARY  +  178 
ROMANIA  +  257 
BULGARIA  +  95 
ALBANIA  .,.  9 
TOTAL  +  373 
CHINA  +  494 




+  34 
- 100 
+  106 
+  58 
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BALANCE  OF  TRADE  BE'IWEEN  THE  NINE  MEMBER  STATES  OF  THE  EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES  AND  THE  EASTERN  EUROPEAN  STATE-TRADING  COUNTRIES 
(in million  EUA) 
TOTALl 
II  TOTAL2 
II 
H 
1975  1976  II  1977  1978  1979  II 
II 
IMPORTS  8,470  11, 331  II  12,301  12,862  16, 155  II 
II 
EXPORTS  11,726  12,523  II  13,226  13,425  14,672  ii 
BALANCE  +3, 256 
II 
+1, 192  II 
II 
+  926  +  563  -1,483 
li 
GOODS  TRADE  II 
II 
II 
TOTAL  20, 196  23,854  II  25,527  26,287  30,827 
II 
II 
1  Source:  EUROSTAT,  monthly bulletins - external trade  - special  number?·-
1958-1976,  pp.  12  and  13 
2  Source:  OECD  - monthly bulletin,  special number  1958-1978 
l,  2  1  d'  lb  '  d  1  d'  '  t  t  d  Inc  u  1ng  A  an1a  an  exc  u  1ng  1n ra-German  ra  e 
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LIST  CF  l1.ECENT  1\NTI-DUHPING  COMPl.i-.IN'!.'S  AGAINST  EASTERN  EUROPEAN  COl.lNTRIES 
A.  AN'l'I-DUNFING  PROCEDURE 
Product  Exporting  Officially  Imposition  of 
country  opened  riqhts 
provi-ldefini-
sional  tive 
Galvanised  sheeting  (hot  Bulgaria  c  19 
dipped) 
24. l.  78 
Poland  c  19  L  19 
24. l.  78  ( 1/2) 
24. l.  78 
GDR  c  19  L  50  L  131 
24. l.  78  22.2.78  (2) 
19.5.78 
Czechoslovakia  c  19 
24. 1. 78 
Heavy  and  medium  plate  Bulgaria  c  19  L  19  L  108(6) 
24. l.  78  24. l.  78  22.4.78 
Hungary  c  19 
24. 1. 78 
Poland  c  19  L  39  L  195 
24. 1. 78  (4/6)  20.7.78 
9.2.78 
GDR  c  19  L  23  L  108(6) 
24. l.  78  28.1.7E  22.4.78 
Romania  c  19  L  23  L  108 
24. 1. 78  28. l.  7E  {5/6) 
22.4.78 
czechoslovakia  c  19  L  19  L  195 
24. l.  78  (3/6)  20.7.78 
Closure after 
'arrangement' 
or  similar 
solution 
c  110 
11.5.78 
c  184 
2.8.78 
Official Journal No. and 
date 
Closure  in  Closure after 
view  of  offic ia  1  re-
'other de- jection of 
velopn>ents'  comolaint 
--
24. l.  7E 
(l}  Extension  OJ  No.  L  108,  22.4.1978,  p.  29,  (2)  Amendment  OJ  No.  L  183,  :. _ 7.1978,  p.  1,  (3)  Extension  OJ  No.  L  106, 
20.4-;l978~--i_);_19~  suspensiflnOJNo;  Lll6,  28.4.~cl978-,->p,.,20,  J4)  EXtensionOJNo.  Ll20,  4,5.1978,  p.  2_~;  OJ  No. 
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Product  Exporting  Officially  Imposition  of 
country  opened  ric hts 
provi- defini-
sional  tive 
Thin  sheet  czechoslovakia  c  19  L  19 
24. 1. 78  (1/2} 
24. 1. 78 
Coils  Bulgaria  c  19  L  37  L  120 
24. 1. 78  7.2.78  (2} 
4.5.78 
Hungary  c  19 
24. 1. 78 
Poland  c  19 
24. 1. 78 
Czechoslovakia  c  19  L  17 
24. 1. 78  (1/2} 
21.1. 78 
USSR  c  19 
24. 1. 78 
Wire  rods  - Hungary  c  19 
24. 1. 78 
Poland  c  19 
24. 1. 78 
czechoslovakia  c  19  L  19 
24. 1. 78  ( 1/2) 
24. 1. 7t 
.. 
Angles,  shapes and  Hungary  c  33 
sections 
9.2.78 
czechoslovakia  c  33 
9.2.78 
Kraft  liner  USSR  c  105 
3.5.78  -
(1)  Extension  OJ  No.  L  106,  20.4.1978;  suspension  OJ  No.  L  116,  28.4.1978 
(2}  Amendment  OJ  No.  L  183,  5.7.1978 
Official Journal  No.  and date 
Closure after  Closure  in  Closure after 
'arrangement'  view  of  off  ic ia  l  re-
or  similar  'other  de- jection  of 
solution  velooments'  c O!llD lain  t 
c  184 
2.8.78 
c  184 
2.8.78 
c  184 
2.8.78 
c  184 
2.8.78 
-
c  184 
2.8.78 
c  110 
11. 5. 78 
c  174 
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Hardboard  ' 
Herbicides 





GDR  ) 
Poland· ) 
Romania) 
Hungary  ) 
Czechoslovakia  ) 
Poland  ) 
GDR  ) 
Bulgaria  ) 
GDR  ) 
Poland  ) 
Romania  ) 
USSR 
czechoslovakia  ) 
Poland  ) 
Romania  ) 
USSR  ) 
Romania 
Romania 
Bulgaria  ) 
Czechoslovakia  ) 
GDR  ) 
Romania  ) 
Hungary  ) 
Poland  ) 
USSR 
Official Journal  No.  and date 
Officially  Imposition  of  Closure after Closure  in  Closure after 
opened  ri< hts  'arrangement'  view  of  official re-
provi- defini- or  similar  'other de- jection  of 
sional  tive  solution  velopments'  complaint 
c  196  c  210 
17.8.78  10.8.79 
c  211  L  97 
5.9.78  15.4.80 
c  277  c  303 
21. 11.78  4.12.79 
c  277  L  297  L  48 
21.11.78  24.11.79  22.2.80 
c  286  L  145 
30.11.78  11. 6. 80 
C3ll 
29.12.78 
c  21  c  109 
24. 1. 79  2.5.79 
c  103  L  53 
25.4.79  27.2.80 
c  103  L  53  L  153 
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Angles,  shapes and 
sections  (iron/steel) 
Saccharin 
Mechanical alarm clocks 
Ball bearings 
r 




GDR  ) 





China  ) 
GDR  ) 
Czechoslovakia) 
USSR  ) 
Poland  ) 
Romania  ) 
USSR  ) 
USSR 
Official Journal No.  and date 
Officially  Imposition  of  Closure after  Closure  in  Closure after 
opened  rights  'arrangement'  view  of  official re-
provi- defini- or  similar  'other de- jection  of 
sional tive  solution  velo2_rnents'  complaint 
c  107  L  113 
28.4.79  l.  5. 80 
c  126  L  274  L  23 
19.5.79  31.10.79  30. 1. 80 
c  146  L  56 
12.6.79  29.2.80 
c  207 
17.8.79 
c  212  L  158  L  158 
24.8.79  25.6.80  25.6.80 
c  235  L  158  L  158 
18.9.79  25.6.80  25.6.80 
c  181 
19.7.80 MOTION  FOR  A  RESOLUTION  (DOCUMENT  l-750/80) 
tabled  by  Mr  Christopher  JACKSON 
pursuant  to  Rule  25  of  -clie  Rules  of  Procedure 
on  detente  and  trade with  Comecon  countries 
The  European  Parliament, 
ANNEX  VIII 
- having  regard  to recent actions  by  the  Soviet  Union  and  other 
Comecon  countries  in relation to human  rights  and  security, 
- recalling  the  work  of  the  Conference  on  European  Security and 
Cooperation  in  Madrid, 
- mindful  of  the  current  tensions  in Eastern Europe, 
1.  Requests  the  Commission,  in  consultation with  Member  States,  to 
institute  an  immediate,  thorough  review  of all trade  and  terms 
of  trade  between  the  Community  and  Comecon  countries; 
2.  Requests  that  a  strategic analysis  be  made  of  such  trade  and 
terms  of  trade  to ascertain 
(a)  whether  products  and  know-how  are  being sold  to  Comecon 
countries,  and  in particular to Russia,  which  might 
directly or  indirectly aid  Russian  military effort; 
(b)  whether  products  and  know-how  are being sold which have  a 
high  content  of  technology  not  readily available  in 
Comecon  countries  and  which  therefore  are  of particular 
advantage  to  those  countries; 
(c)  whether products  and  know-how  are  being sold  to  Comecon 
countries  on  terms  which  can bring damage  to European 
industry or  commerce  through  subsequent  imports  resulting 
from  such  sales  or  terms  of·sale 
(d)  whether  the  Community  is becoming  reliant  in  any  important 
respect  on  imports  from  Comecon  countries; 
- 58  - PE  68.466ifin./Ann. VIII 3.  Asks  that the  Commission,  in  consultation with  Member  States 
and  coordinating action with  the  United  States  and  Japan,  should 
propose  appropriate  action and  plans  to  reduce  any  European 
Community reliance  on  Comecon  imports,  and  to  reduce  any  strategic 
advantages  currently given  to Russia  and  other Comecon  countries 
through  Community  trade;  adjusting this policy periodically 
according  to  the  state of detente; 
4.  Instructs  its President  to  forward  this resolution  to  the 
Commission,  the  Council  of  Ministers,  the  Foreign Ministers 
acting  in political cooperation and  the  Governments  of  the 
United  States  and  Japan. 
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